Truly Standard-Essential Patents? A Semantics-Based Analysis by Brachtendorf, Lorenz et al.
Truly Standard-Essential Patents? A
Semantics-Based Analysis
Lorenz Brachtendorf (MPI-IC & LMU Munich)
Fabian Gaessler (MPI-IC Munich)
Dietmar Harhoff (MPI-IC & LMU Munich)
Discussion Paper No. 265
December 22, 2020
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 | www.rationality-and-competition.de
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spokesperson: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany
+49 (89) 2180 3405 | info@rationality-and-competition.de
Truly Standard-Essential Patents?
A Semantics-Based Analysis
Lorenz Brachtendorf ab Fabian Gaessler a Dietmar Harhoff abc
a
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich
b
Munich School of Management, Ludwig-Maximilians-University (LMU), Munich
c
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London
ABSTRACT
Standard-essential patents (SEPs) have become a key element of technical coordination in standard-
setting organizations. Yet, in many cases, it remains unclear whether a declared SEP is truly standard-
essential. To date, there is no automated procedure that allows for a scalable and objective assessment of
SEP status. This paper introduces a semantics-based method for approximating the standard essential-
ity of patents. We provide details on the procedure that generates the measure of standard essentiality
and present the results of several validation exercises. In a first empirical application we illustrate the
measure’s usefulness in estimating the share of true SEPs in firm patent portfolios for several mobile
telecommunication standards. We find firm-level differences that are statistically significant and eco-
nomically substantial. Furthermore, we observe a general decline in the average share of presumably
true SEPs between successive standard generations.
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1 Introduction
In light of increasing demand for the interoperability and interconnectivity of information
and communication technologies, standardization has become an important aspect of tech-
nological innovation. The successful development and adoption of standards depend on
ex ante coordination among technology contributors and implementers – in particular, if
proprietary technologies are to be incorporated (Lerner and Tirole, 2015; Spulber, 2019).
Standard-essential patents (SEPs) protect inventions that are part of technical standards.
By definition, to avoid infringement any firm implementing the standard will require a li-
cense to all standard-related SEPs. However, due to the vast amount of potentially relevant
patents and uncertain patent scope, the identification of SEPs poses a considerable chal-
lenge to potential implementers.1 To facilitate the adoption and diffusion of technology
standards, standard-setting organizations (SSOs) typically demand from their members to
timely disclose SEPs through declaration. This declaration of standard essentiality is based
on the assessment of the respective patent holder and usually involves no further verifica-
tion by the SSO or a third party.
Ideally, only those patents are declared to be standard-essential that protect a rele-
vant technological contribution to the standard, i.e., are truly standard-essential. However,
there are several factors beyond technical merit that may influence whether a patent is de-
clared standard-essential.2 Most notably, there are concerns that firms declare patents to
be standard-essential due to strategic reasons (Dewatripont and Legros, 2013).3 Anecdotal
evidence from policy reports and case studies strongly suggests that standard essentiality
is not necessarily guaranteed by the patent holder’s declaration (see Contreras, 2019, for
an overview). In fact, the claim of standard essentiality frequently fails to survive scrutiny
if the patent is disputed in court (Lemley and Simcoe, 2019). Uncertainty about the true
standard essentiality of a patent may introduce legal and contractual frictions, as it creates
considerable transaction costs during the standardization process and subsequent licensing
negotiations. With policy-makers interested in a fair and efficient framework for the devel-
opment and adoption of technical standards, SEP essentiality checks have recently come
into regulatory focus (EC, 2017).4
1See, for instance, the Communication from the European Commission in November, 2017 (EC, 2017).
2In this study, we focus on technical standard essentiality. We discuss different essentiality definitions in
Section 2.
3Several other reasons may also play a role (Bekkers et al., 2011). First, standards as well as patents may
change in their scope over time. Second, disclosure rules imposed by the SSO may be ambiguous, affecting
patent holders in their decision to declare patents as standard-essential. Third, patent holders may simply
lack familiarity with the standard and/or their own patent portfolio.
4Several voices have suggested that patent offices should assess the standard essentiality of patents. Con-
sequently, the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) offers a fee-based service comprising an advisory opinion on the
standard essentiality of patents starting since April 2018.
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This study introduces a semantics-based method to approximate the standard essen-
tiality of patents. This method relies on a novel measure of semantic similarity between
patents and standards and is scalable, objective, and replicable. In recent years, text-based
measures have proven to be useful for the empirical assessment of similarity and technolog-
ical relatedness between patents (e.g., Arts et al., 2018; Natterer, 2016; Younge and Kuhn,
2016). Extending this approach, we propose a method for a semantics-based comparison
of patent texts and specifications of technical standards. In several validation exercises, we
show that the calculated similarity can be used as the core variable to generate a mean-
ingful approximation of standard essentiality. First, we investigate the semantic similarity
of patent-standard pairs by comparing SEP declarations with control groups of patents in
the same technology class and standard documents from the same standardization project.
We observe a significantly higher semantic similarity for pairs of SEP-declared patents and
related standards than for random pairs. Second, we replicate the study by Bekkers et al.
(2017) regarding the effect of SEP declarations on the number of subsequent patent for-
ward citations. We show that the magnitude of this ‘disclosure effect’ is considerably larger
when focusing on subsets of SEP declarations with particularly high semantic similarity. We
then employ a multivariate logit framework to construct a predictor of standard essentiality.
This exercise uses manual engineering assessments of patents for three mobile telecommu-
nication standards as they were utilized in the US court case of TCL v. Ericsson. Based on
these data, we show that our similarity measure is an statistically significant and important
predictor of the court-approved SEP assessments.
As recent legal disputes have exemplified, the calculation of licensing fees for standard
technologies often involves not just single SEPs but whole SEP portfolios. As Contreras
(2017a) states, the recent case of TCL v. Ericsson “[...] highlights the potential importance
of essentiality determinations not on a patent-by-patent basis, but on an aggregate basis.” In
a first empirical application, we therefore illustrate our method’s usefulness to assess stan-
dard essentiality at the portfolio level. Extending our predictions to all declared SEPs of
contributors to standards for mobile telecommunication (GSM, UMTS, and LTE), we es-
timate the share of (presumably) true SEPs in the respective firm patent portfolios. We
document the high accuracy of our approach when predicting standard essentiality at the
patent portfolio level. Considering the aggregated results, we find strong firm-level differ-
ences in the estimated share of (presumably) true SEPs. These differences are statistically
significant and economically substantial. Among all SEP portfolios, the highest-ranked firm
has a share of (presumably) true SEPs that is roughly twice as large as the one for the
lowest-ranked firm. Moreover, we observe a decline in the share of presumably true SEPs
over the three successive generations of mobile telecommunication standards. We discuss
possible explanations of this intriguing result in the paper.
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So far, analysts seeking to ascertain the true status of an SEP-declared patents had only
two choices: to take SEP declarations at face value or to rely on costly expert assessments.5
By introducing a new method for approximating standard essentiality via an algorithm, this
study makes various academic as well as practical contributions. First, we illustrate how a
semantics-based tool can be used to measure the essentiality of patents for specific technical
standards. The novel method is not just simple and inexpensive in use, it is also scalable,
objective and replicable. Prior data on essentiality checks have required substantial tech-
nical knowledge and effort. The measure developed in this study, by contrast, can easily
be applied to any large set of SEPs. This opens up new avenues of empirical research for
scholars interested in standardization, patents, and firm strategy. For instance, the intro-
duced method may help determine the present or historical population of over- as well as
under-declared SEPs for a given standard, SSO, or industry. Such insights should facilitate
the assessment whether current SSO policies achieve their goal of mitigating patent-related
frictions in the standard-setting and implementation process.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys the prior literature and describes
the relationship between patent rights and standards. Section 3 details the methodology of
our semantics-based approach. Section 4 then introduces the data used in the subsequent
analyses. In Section 5 descriptive results that validate the method are provided. Finally
a first use case on determining the share of (presumably) true SEPs in firm portfolios is
presented in Section 6, followed by a brief discussion and outlook on further use cases of
our essentiality measure.
2 Institutional Background and Prior Literature
2.1 Standard-setting organizations and SEPs
Technical standards typically incorporate a large number of complementary technological
solutions owned by various organizations such as firms, research institutes, or universi-
ties. To lower transaction costs and gain efficiencies in the development and distribution
of standardized technologies, SSOs coordinate the development of such standards (Contr-
eras, 2019). SSOs differ in various dimensions such as technological focus, membership
composition as well as policies and practices (Bekkers and Updegrove, 2013; Chiao et al.,
2007; EC, 2019). One important and frequently studied aspect of SSO policies concerns the
5See, for instance, the study of Goodman and Myers (2005) and, most recently, Stitzing et al. (2017),
both drawing on manual assessments of declared SEPs by patent attorneys and engineers. Further publicly
available reports include SEP assessments by Cyber Creative Institute, Article One Partners, Jefferies and
iRunway. With reference to potential subjectivity and bias in manual evaluations, essentiality assessments by
technical experts are not universally considered credible (cf. Mallinson, 2017).
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IP-related rules and regulations (Baron and Spulber, 2018; Lemley, 2002) with particular
focus on the practiced licensing regime and the disclosure of SEPs.
Rules on the declaration of SEPs are SSO-specific and may address particular aspects,
such as upfront patent searches, disclosure content, as well as disclosure timing, and may
or may not be binding. For instance, some SSOs demand their members to disclose relevant
intellectual property whereas other SSOs only encourage them to do so. Furthermore, firms
may also be required to make reasonable efforts to search for potentially standard-essential
IP. SSOs can also differ in terms of the necessary declaration content. At ETSI, for example,
the specific disclosure of SEPs is mandatory whereas at other large SSOs, such as IEEE or
ITU-T, blanket declarations are allowed. Similarly, requirements on the timing of disclosure
might be interpreted as guidelines rather than strict obligations. Most SSOs specify rules
that demand a timely disclosure either before the approval of the standard, as soon as pos-
sible, or upon an official call for patents. Breaching the duty to disclose relevant intellectual
property rights may have serious economic and legal implications.
2.2 Declared SEPs and true standard essentiality
Patents that protect technological solutions required for the implementation of a particular
standard are typically referred to as standard-essential patents (SEPs). The status of an
SEP is commonly set through the rights holder’s own declaration. In practice, however,
the determination of standard essentiality proves challenging, and quite frequently, the
question whether a patent is truly standard-essential needs to be solved in court.6 Generally,
technical standard essentiality is defined by the patent claims that cover a particular part
of the technical standard. That is, the patent is standard-essential if the invention inherent
to the implementation of the respective standard falls within the scope of the respective
patent’s claims. Beyond this definition, SSOs sometimes differentiate between technical
and commercial essentiality. Whereas the former refers to purely technical aspects of the
patented invention, commercial essentiality includes the additional consideration whether
the patented invention is the only commercially feasible solution for the respective standard.
Most SSOs focus on the technical essentiality, ETSI even explicitly rules out commercial
factors when determining essentiality (Contreras, 2017a). Yet, standards describe a range
of technical processes and solutions and may thereby refer to multiple patented inventions.
Vice versa, patented inventions can be essential to more than one standard specification.7
Consequently, the standard essentiality of a patent needs to be understood (and ultimately
6See Contreras (2017a) for a thorough summary of different concepts of essentiality, the legal issues
arising from those, and the relevant case law on essentiality assessments.
7Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) is only one out of many examples for technologies that are part
of several standards at different SSOs, as for instance IEEE’s WiFi and the 3GPP standard LTE.
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assessed) with regard to a particular standard.
Apart from this complex many-to-many relationship between patents and standards, a
patent’s standard essentiality status can also be time-variant. SSOs aim to include the best
available technological solutions into a standard and thus often encourage the timely dis-
closure of patents covering even potentially standard-relevant technologies. Still, standards
evolve over time, so that obsolete technologies are removed from the standard and replaced
by more recent alternative technologies. Likewise, patent claims are not perfectly static ei-
ther. During patent examination, amendments to the claims of the patent application may
change the patent’s relevance to a given standard. After the patent has been granted, its
scope of protection may be narrowed as a result of validity challenges, which likely affects
standard essentiality.
At the time of disclosure, SEP declarations are typically neither verified nor challenged
by the respective SSO. Presumably, this is due to cost and liability reasons. Given their non-
binding nature, SEP declarations are also rarely withdrawn or updated after the finalization
of the standard. As a result, they may represent a poor signal of true standard essentiality
which typically remains private information held by the respective rights holder. However,
a patent’s true standard essentiality becomes public knowledge in some cases. First, results
of standard essentiality assessments are disclosed through court decisions.8 SEP litigation
usually deals with selected subsets of SEPs rather than with entire SEP portfolios or, let
alone, all SEPs for a particular standard.9 Second, true standard essentiality of patents can
be inferred from SEP assessments by third parties, which do not occur within the context
of SEP lawsuits. The costs of such legally non-binding contractual essentiality assessments
vary significantly depending on the evaluators’ scrutiny.10 Finally, some patent pools follow
the practice to conduct standard essentiality assessments before they include a given SEP
(Contreras, 2017a; Quint, 2014). Hence, patent pool inclusion can serve as a signal for true
8Although SEP litigation takes place in Europe as well (cf. Contreras et al., 2017), the US remain the
hotspot for SEP litigation. Lemley and Simcoe (2019) provide evidence for the presence of non-essential
SEPs in the context of SEP litigations before US courts. They examine SEPs brought to court and find, in
particular, that SEPs held by non-practicing entities (NPEs) are less likely to be deemed infringed than a set
of litigated SEP patents held by operating companies.
9The only exception is the recent lawsuit Ericsson v. TCL where a fairly large number of SEPs for the mobile
telecommunication standards GSM, UMTS and LTE was assessed in order to determine fair, reasonable and
non-discriminatory (FRAND) royalty rates.
10A report to the European Commission broadly differentiates between three confidence levels of essential-
ity (EC, 2014). Low-level assessments are estimated to cost around 600-1,800 EUR per patent (corresponding
to 1-3 days of work). Industry studies that report on the essentiality of different samples of SEPs may be cate-
gorized into this low level assessment. The experts of these studies usually spend only a few hours per patent
and would hence be even at the lower bound of this classification. Somewhat more detailed essentiality
checks are conducted when patents are to be incorporated into a patent pool. Estimated costs are approxi-
mately 5,000-15,000 EUR depending on prior knowledge on the patent and on the number of claims to be
assessed. Even more sophisticated assessments start at 20,000 EUR and comprise essentiality checks in the
context of lawsuits on smaller subsets of SEPs.
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standard essentiality, even though this again applies to a selected set of SEPs only.
2.3 SEPs and firm behavior
Holding patent rights for standard-essential technologies comes along with a range of di-
rect and indirect benefits. SEPs represent revenue-generating opportunities as all standard
implementers become potential licensees. Moreover, firms may improve their bargaining
position in cross-licensing negotiations if they also hold SEPs.11 Hence, it seems reasonable
to assume that firms follow various strategies to increase the chance of holding standard-
relevant patents. First of all, firms may decide to promote their own patented technologies
for inclusion in a given standard through engagement in the standardization process.12
Apart from that, firms may conduct what is commonly known as just-in-time patenting (Kang
and Bekkers, 2015). Namely, firms intentionally file patents shortly before standardization
meetings. The proximity in time allows those firms to increase the standard essentiality
of the patented technology by aligning the patent’s text to drafts of the standard descrip-
tion that are already in circulation. A similar pattern can be observed even after filing in
the form of purposive patent amendments and patent continuations (Berger et al., 2012;
Omachi, 2004). Firms tend to amend the claims of their pending patent applications to
ensure that they align with the latest version of the standard.13
Firms usually enjoy some discretion in their decision whether or not to declare their
patent as standard-essential. In this context, one can distinguish between the over-
declaration and under-declaration of SEPs. The over-declaration of SEPs refers to the dec-
laration of (ultimately) non-essential patent rights as SEPs. Reasons for over-declaration
can be found in over-compliance with SSO disclosure obligations and opportunism. Patent
holders may over-declare due to the evident asymmetry in potential sanctions. Typically,
SSOs IP policies entail harsher punishments for not disclosing standard-essential patents
rather than for disclosing standard-irrelevant patents (Contreras, 2017a). Moreover, SSOs
often encourage patent holders to disclose not only patents that are essential, but also
patents that may become essential to future versions of the standard. Here, the decision to
disclose SEPs may be influenced by the patent holder’s own opinion about which techno-
logical solution will prevail. More opportunistic reasons for over-declaration may lie in the
firm’s goal to increase licensing revenues and to secure freedom to operate (EC, 2013). The
11In fact, there is some empirical evidence that SEPs are on average more valuable (Rysman and Simcoe,
2008) and that SEP ownership correlates with financial performance (Hussinger and Schwiebacher, 2015;
Pohlmann et al., 2016).
12In line with this, Bekkers et al. (2011) and Leiponen (2008) find that SSO membership and participa-
tion in the standardization process play an important role for technology selection. Furthermore, Kang and
Motohashi (2015) find a positive correlation between inventor presence and the likelihood of SEP declaration.
13Berger et al. (2012) further find that such patents are also more likely to have a higher number of claims
and longer grant lags, resulting from those changes to the patent application.
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common practice of SEP counting in licensing agreements may incentivize such a behavior,
since licensing revenues are often tied to the number of SEPs a firm holds (Dewatripont and
Legros, 2013). This is particularly true for top-down approaches, which are frequently used
when determining SEP royalty rates in court (Contreras, 2017a). Furthermore, a firm may
inflate their SEP portfolio to gain leverage for cross-licensing deals with other SEP holders
(Shapiro, 2001).
In contrast, under-declaration of SEPs refers to truly essential patents that remain un-
declared. The failure to declare can be unintentional, as the patent holder may simply be
unaware of its patents’ relevance to a particular standard. However, under-declaration can
also be the result of willful misconduct to benefit from hold-up situations. Here, patent
holders deliberately keep their patents undisclosed up to the point of time when the stan-
dard is already implemented. The patent holder can then charge licensing fees, which are
not bound to common royalty cap provisions, such as FRAND terms (Lemley and Shapiro,
2006).14 There is little empirical evidence for under-declaration, but an often-cited exam-
ple represents the case of Rambus.15Note that failing to timely disclose potentially essential
patents can directly lead to antitrust liabilities. As a result, SSO policies that are supposed
to counter under-declaration may in turn incentivize SEP over-declaration.
3 Methodology
In this section, we introduce a novel approach measuring semantic similarity between
patents and technical standards. First, we briefly discuss the current state of the literature
on semantic algorithms applied to patent text data and explain the peculiarities concerning
the application of such algorithms to patents and standards. We then provide details on the
mechanics of our approach and the resulting similarity measures.
3.1 Prior patent text-based measures
Text-based measures have become a popular tool in the empirical assessment of patent sim-
ilarity (see Abbas et al., 2014, for an overview). Natterer (2016) developed a sophisticated
semantic algorithm to search technologically closely related patents. In an application, he
shows that similarity density measures are negatively correlated with patent value. The
14Depending on the jurisdiction, the patent holder may also be more likely to obtain injunctive relief against
infringement if the patent remains undeclared (Larouche and Zingales, 2017). However, non-disclosed
standard-essential patents may also be deemed unenforceable, as recently decided in Core Wireless Licens-
ing v. Apple Inc.
15Rambus failed to disclose its relevant patents and patent applications during a standard-setting process
at JEDEC, an SSO in the microelectronics industry. Rambus’ subsequent royalty claims against locked-in
manufacturers were quickly followed by legal disputes and anti-trust concerns.
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author argues that patents with particularly high similarity to many other patents may
be located in very dense technological subfields with increasing competitive pressure and
therefore, may have lower economic value. Younge and Kuhn (2016) introduce a vector
space model to measure patent-to-patent similarity and provide details on significant im-
provements upon current patent classification schemes. More recently, Arts et al. (2018)
used text similarity to measure the technological relatedness between patents and applied
their novel approach to prior empirical findings on the localization of knowledge spillovers.
So far, all these applications were restricted to texts within the patent universe. A no-
table exception is the early study by Magerman et al. (2009). Here, the authors use vector
space models and latent semantic indexing to detect similarities between the patents filed
and the scientific publications written by a small set of academic inventors. To the best of
our knowledge, measuring the similarity between patents and standards has not yet been
explored on a scientific and systematic basis.
3.2 Mechanics of the approach
We rely on a sophisticated and field-proven text-mining algorithm to measure the semantic
similarity between patents and standards.16 The algorithm has been specifically developed
to handle patent as well as patent-related texts and incorporates various text pre-processing
techniques and automatic language corrections. The algorithm incorporates various tech-
niques of natural language processing, such as part-of-speech tagging, spelling correction,
n-grams, stop words, stemming techniques, entropy-based weighting, and synonym dic-
tionaries. In line with other text-mining algorithms, a vector space model is employed to
calculate the semantic similarity between two defined texts. The algorithm measures the
similarity between patents, but can also be used to measure the similarity between patents
and any other input text (such as product specifications, scientific publications, Wikipedia
articles, etc.). Its major advantage is the very efficient implementation which allows for a
comparison of any (large) text to the patent universe and yields a list with the most similar
patents ranked by their similarity score.17 Due to performance purposes, semantic similar-
ity scores are integers and scaled between 0 and 1,000. Similarity scores of 0 mean that
the two input texts have nothing in common whereas scores of 1,000 imply that they are
next to identical.
16The algorithm is part of a commercial tool that has been developed by octimine technologies GmbH
(now: Dennemeyer Octimine GmbH). The primary use case of this tool is the search for closely related prior
art. See Jürgens and Clarke (2018) and Natterer (2016) for more information.
17Note that similarity is measured at patent family level, with the most recent publication of a (granted)
patent family member used as text input. Only EP, US, WO and DE publications are considered (in this order).
German text is machine translated into English. Note that the latest publication is the one most relevant for
SEP enforcement.
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For illustration purposes, we provide an example of a patent-standard pair with evi-
dently high text similarity. The selected example for a standard is the technical specifi-
cation ETSI TS 126 192 V8.0.0 (2009-01), which describes technologies related to speech
coding and comfort noise aspects within the UMTS and LTE standards projects. According
to our semantic algorithm, the most similar patent for this specification is the granted US
patent with publication number 6,662,155 (‘Method and system for comfort noise generation
in speech communication’). The patent was declared to the respective standard specification
on June 18, 2009, and appears to have a particularly high textual similarity to the standard.
In Figure 1, we exemplarily contrast parts of the technical specification with an excerpt from
the patent description. Similar and identical words are highlighted to illustrate the semantic
similarity of both.18
Figure 1: Text similarity between patents and standards
Patent publication:
US 6,662,155 B2 (2003-12-09)
"The background noise can be classified
as stationary or non-stationary based on
the spectral distances  D
i
from each
of the spectral parameter (LSF or ISF)
vectors f (i) to the other spectral pa-
rameter vectors f ( j), i = 0, . . . , l
dtx
 
1, j = 0, . . . , l
dtx





ETSI TS 126 192 V8.0.0 (2009-01)
"The encoder first determines how station-
ary background noise is. Dithering is
employed for non-stationary background
noise. The information about whether to
use dithering or not is transmitted to the




The binary value for the CN
dith
-flag is
found by using the spectral distance  S
i
of the spectral parameter vector f (i) to
the spectral parameter vector f ( j) of all
the other frames j = 0, . . . , l
dtx
  1, j 6= i
within the CN averaging period (l
dtx
)."
In line with the previous literature on text-based similarity between patents, we interpret
the semantic similarity between patents and standards as a measure of their technological
similarity. We consider this a valid extension for the following reasons. First, patent texts
as well as standard specifications are highly technical texts and are reasonably comparable
to each other as illustrated by the above example. Second, standard documents are utilized
by patent examiners, patent attorneys and inventors alike, which underlines their role as
18If we deliberately exclude similar terms (e.g., the highlighted parts in the figure above) from the stan-
dard text, the measured similarity between standard and this specific patent decreases considerably. This
demonstrates that semantic similarity is mostly driven by such technologically similar sections.
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informative technology descriptions.19 In Section 5, we provide evidence for the validity
of patent-standard text similarity as a measure of technological similarity and ultimately
standard essentiality.
The used text-mining algorithm is proprietary, which renders some aspects of the sim-
ilarity calculation non-transparent and also complicates replication. To illustrate the gen-
eral feasibility of semantic algorithms for measuring patent-standard similarity, we apply
straightforward techniques implemented in freely available text-mining packages in R and
Python. The results based on these open-source algorithms are comparable, yet remain
inferior to our similarity measure, in particular for very large text data. Details on this
technical exercise can be found in the Online Appendix D.
3.3 Similarity measures
In the following analyses, we apply two different measures to approximate the true
standard-essentiality of a patent: 1) the similarity score as an absolute value calculated by
the algorithm, and 2) the similarity rank, which represents the focal patent’s rank relative
to all other patents in the patent universe (ordered by their similarity score). The measures
are strongly correlated with each other and can be used individually to quantify patent-
standard similarity. However, there are some subtle differences how to interpret them.
Whereas the former can be considered as a measure independent from other patents and
comparable across standards, only the similarity rank provides the standard-specific order
of the most similar patents. For each standards text, both similarity measures are retrieved
for the most similar 3,000 patent families. Although this allows us to limit the amount of
data, it also introduces the need to account for truncation (or censoring, respectively) when
interpreting our results.
19For instance, Bekkers et al. (2016) find that standard documentations contain relevant prior art that is
used to assess a patent’s novelty during examination.
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4 Data and Descriptives
In this section, we first describe the used data and then provide selected descriptive statis-
tics.
4.1 Data
Standard documents and SEP declarations
We employ two distinct datasets provided by the European Telecommunication Standards
Institute (ETSI). ETSI has been established more than thirty years ago and is one of the most
important standard-setting organizations in the ICT sector. The most successful standards
in telecommunication such as DECT, TETRA, GSM, UMTS, LTE and most recently 5G have
been set either directly by ETSI or within the framework of the 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP).20 In terms of the absolute number of declared SEPs, ETSI is by far the largest
and most important SSO (Baron and Pohlmann, 2018).
ETSI’s IPR database provides detailed information on SEP declarations submitted during
the standardization process. Firms and other organizations involved in the standard setting
process at ETSI are obliged to make their relevant IPR available. In declaration letters, they
disclose information on their relevant patents with regard to particular standards. The level
of detail in such declaration letters varies substantially. Whereas some declarations only cite
the overall standards project, most others specify the relevant technical specification (TS)
and – to some extent – even the specific version of the standard. The IPR data can be
readily downloaded and provides most of the information on declarations as listed on the
ETSI website.21
In addition to the information on declared SEPs and their relevance for standards, the
second ETSI database provides details on technical standards. We focus on documents of
standards that have been approved and published by ETSI. As of November 11, 2016, the
online standards database stores 40,461 documents. The vast majority of documents is
available in the portable document format (PDF), is therefore machine readable and can
immediately be used for further analyses.22 The major part of the documents refers to
European standards (EN) and technical specifications (TS) for the different generations of
mobile telecommunication standards: GSM, UMTS, and LTE. The set of documents covers
203GPP is a global network of seven standards organizations of which ETSI is one of the key organizations.
21As a matter of fact, some declarations are even more fine-grained and indicate the specific sections,
figures and tables to which the patent is deemed essential. This information is not part of the IPR data, but
can be found on the ETSI website. We retrieved this and further information (e.g., the person responsible for
declarations within the organization) and merged them to the IPR database.
22However, roughly 9% of these files are encrypted or cannot be accessed for other technical reasons.
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all releases and all versions of the approved standards, depicting the evolution of standards
over time.
Standard documents are quite distinct documents in several aspects. They provide
guidelines on the technologies implemented in a standard in a very detailed and structured
manner. Standard documents published by ETSI typically start with the table of contents,
references, definitions and abbreviations, followed by the main content, and end with the
annex as well as the version history. The length of such documents varies substantially. The
average number of pages for all 40,461 documents is 129 pages (median: 44) with some
documents comprising thousands of pages. For the subset of standards which are cited in
SEP declarations, the average page number is 194 (median: 84) and hence even larger.
However, SEPs typically refer to very specific parts within the technical specifications. It
should be evident that a semantic comparison of patents with full standard documents
comes with considerable noise which may compromise our predictions. Making use of the
structured format of standard documents, we developed a routine that automatically identi-
fies the table of contents of a standard document and then compartmentalizes the document
into chapters, sections and subsections as stated in the table of contents of the document.
Using string matching and similarity metrics, we are able to identify the text of all sections
in a structured manner.23 This allows us to make precise comparisons between patents
and specific standard specifications. For the sample of machine-readable documents, we
identify 446,666 unique standard document chapters. To keep the task computationally
feasible, we restrict the semantic analyses on chapter specific texts to subsamples of all
standard documents.
Patents
On patent side, the algorithm draws on full text information, which includes the title, ab-
stract, claims and description of a patent document. Text information is obtained from the
databases of the European Patent Office (EPO), the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In total, full text
information for approximately 37 million patent documents is used.
We further add bibliographic information on the patents from PATSTAT (autumn 2017
version).24 We retrieve information on patent families, technology classes, inventor team
size, co-applications as well as detailed information on patent claims and furthermore com-
pute various forward and backward citation measures on patent family level necessary for
our validity checks.
23To this end, we use edit distance functions such as the restricted Damerau-Levenshtein distance.
24The Worldwide Patent Statistical Database PATSTAT from the European Patent Office (EPO) covers the




All standards that are referenced in SEP declarations are identified which leaves us with
a set of 4,796 referenced standard documents. The semantic algorithm described in the
previous sections is then used to compare those documents to the approximately 37 million
patent documents from the patent database.
We generate two datasets on the similarity between patents and standards. The first
dataset includes the 14,388,000 pairs of patent families and standards. Here, the calcu-
lation of the similarity scores is done at the document level. The second dataset includes
a more fine-grained comparison between patents and standards at the chapter level. For
4,500 of the 4,796 standard documents, our routine was able to identify the table of con-
tents and to extract the relevant chapters. The compartmentalization of these documents
yields a total of 62,482 chapters. Generating the similarity scores for those texts results in
187,398,000 observations at the patent-standard level.
4.2 Sample description
In Table 1, we report summary statistics for the two similarity measures (similarity score
and similarity rank) based on full text as well as chapter-specific data of the standard doc-
uments. The measures reveal some distinct differences in similarity across different sam-
ples of patent-standard pairs. We provide statistics on all patents and SEPs, where patent-
standard pairs are endogenously determined by the highest similarity. Furthermore, we
provide statistics on SEP declarations, where patent-standard pairs are predefined. We ob-
serve notable differences in the measured similarity. The average similarity score of SEPs to
their most similar chapters is 377 whereas the average in the full sample of patent-chapter
pairs is 216.
Figure 2a shows the similarity score distributions for all patents and the subset of all
SEPs.In Figure 2b, the similarity rank distribution of SEPs illustrates that SEPs are among
the highest ranked patent-standard pairs. Notably, about one third of all SEPs that were
declared at ETSI are among the top 20 for the corresponding standards text. Similarly, in
Figure 2c, the percentage of SEPs declared at ETSI is plotted against the rank reporting
the two samples of SEPs that are included in the chapter dataset (blue line) and full text
datasets (red line). For the former, we observe 86% of declared SEPs within the top 3,000
patent families whereas for the sample with full text documents only 66% are observed.
Roughly 48% are included within the top 100 patents for chapter, but only 22% for full text
information. Altogether, this strongly indicates that comparisons are more precise when
shorter texts, i.e., chapters, are used in the analyses.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Similarity data
Sample Variable Mean SD SE Min Max N
Document level
All Score 218 67 0.018 62 818 14388000
Rank 1500 866 0.228 1 3000 14388000
SEPs Score 315 96 0.907 71 818 11311
Rank 926 933 8.774 1 3000 11311
Chapter level
All Score 216 69 0.005 37 945 187397890
Rank 1501 866 0.063 1 3000 187397890
SEPs Score 377 113 0.935 48 817 14713
Rank 663 838 6.906 1 3000 14713
Notes: Summary statistics for similarity score and similarity rank (at document and chapter level) for all
patents and the subsample of SEPs. Minimum (maximum) possible score: 0 (1,000). Lowest (highest) pos-
sible rank: 3,000 (1).
5 Validation Results and Predictions
We conduct three distinct validation exercises.25 First, we investigate the technological sim-
ilarity between patents and standards by comparing SEP declarations with control groups
of patents and standards in the same technology class and the same standards project.
Second, we replicate the study by Bekkers et al. (2017) about the (positive) effect of SEP
declarations on the number of subsequent patent forward citations. Here, we show that the
magnitude of this ‘disclosure effect’ is considerably larger when focusing on subsets of SEP
declarations with high similarity ranks. Third, we benchmark our results with a dataset of
manually examined SEPs for the mobile telecommunication standards GSM, UMTS and LTE.
Based on these data, we test the predictive power of our novel semantics-based similarity
measure to determine true standard essentiality.
5.1 Comparison of declared SEPs with control groups
The first step to validate our semantic approach involves a comparison of declared SEPs
with patents describing technologies from the very same technology class. If our measure
has any explanatory value, declared SEPs will be significantly more similar to the respective
25Furthermore, in the Online Appendix C we estimate multivariate (OLS) regression models in which we
regress the semantic similarity measure on various patent characteristics and compare our results qualitatively
with those reported by Stitzing et al. (2017).
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Figure 2: Distribution of SEPs in similarity dataset






























































Notes: The top figure shows the similarity score distribution for two different sets of patents. All patents
in the full sample (blue bars) are compared to the set of SEPs declared at ETSI (white bars). The bottom
left-hand graph shows the similarity rank distribution for SEPs at chapter level. The bottom right-hand graph
shows the aggregate share of SEPs by similarity rank at the chapter (blue line) and document level (red line).
standard than the control patents.26 We exploit the information that SEP declarations at
ETSI usually cite the respective standard. We name these predefined pairs of declared
SEPs and standards SEP declarations and compare those to pairs of the same standard and
undeclared patents from the same technology class and cohort. To this end, we select
patents with the same CPC-4 codes (e.g., one of the most common technology classes is
the H04W 72 class for local resource managements in wireless communications networks)
26As discussed in previous sections, many declared SEPs at ETSI may under scrutiny turn out to be non-
essential for the referenced standard. We still expect that the full sample of declared SEPs is significantly more
similar to the respective standards as compared to control patents due to the set of correctly declared and
hence truly essential patents. We note that the control group comparison with all SEPs renders the average
difference in similarity a lower bound.
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and same patent priority year. Furthermore, we only take into account patent families that
have at least one US or EP publication. Control patents are randomly chosen from this
pre-selected group of patents.
Vice versa, we now hold the declared SEP fixed and compare the associated standard
document to another randomly chosen standard document from the same ETSI standards
project27 and the same publication year. Selecting the most similar chapter for each patent,
we observe 15,000 SEP-standard document pairs (SEP declarations) in our data. As ex-
plained before, we only observe the 3,000 most similar patent families for each chapter of
each standard document cited in SEP declarations and therefore have to deal with either
truncation or censoring. Restricting the truncated sample to those patent families with at
least one US or EP patent family member, we obtain a total of 29,380 treated and control
patents. Note that the control patent is not necessarily within the set of the 3,000 most
similar patent families. In this case, we conservatively assign the lowest observed similar-
ity value for the given standard to the control patent. This likely results in a considerable
overestimation of similarity scores for control patents.28
Figure 3 compares the distribution of similarity scores for each group. On the left-hand
side, SEPs are compared with control patents. The mean difference in similarity scores
is approximately 59 points. On the right-hand side, standards that are referenced in SEP
declarations are compared with control standards. Here, the mean difference in similarity
scores is about 135. All differences are statistically significant with t-values greater than 60
(Table B-1 in the Appendix reports the corresponding t-statistics). To summarize, the results
of our control group comparison strongly suggest that semantic approaches are appropriate
to measure technological similarity between patents and standards.
5.2 Replicating the ETSI ‘disclosure effect’
In the second validation exercise we replicate the study of Bekkers et al. (2017) and re-
estimate the ‘disclosure effect’ of SEP declarations on patent forward citations. Bekkers
et al. (2017) propose that the disclosure of SEPs should lead to an increase in patent forward
citations, reflecting the gain in economic value after the implementation of the patented
technology into a standard. While they find this to be true for various other SSOs, the
estimated effect is negative for SEPs declared at ETSI.29 Consequently, ETSI may have a
27We classify standard documents based on keywords occurring in the title of the standard document. We
differentiate between the following groups of standards: LTE, UMTS, GSM, DECT, TETRA, DVB, DAB, ISDN,
or any other standard.
28We obtain similar results using censored data for both SEPs and controls (see Figure A-1 in the Appendix).
29The authors explain this surprising finding with ETSI’s special IPR policy. The early disclosure of po-
tentially essential patents induces competition effects. The disclosure of patents covering poor technological
solutions may be followed by the emergence of alternative technological solutions, which then become part
of the standard instead.
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Notes: The box plot on the left-hand side shows the difference in similarity scores of SEP declarations (blue)
and control patents compared to the same standard (red). On the right-hand side, similarity scores of SEP
declarations (blue) are compared to similarity scores of the same SEP and control standards (red). Statistics
are shown in Table B-1.
high share of declared SEPs that are in fact never implemented in a standard and therefore
not truly essential.
Using our novel measure, we can identify those declared SEPs which are particularly
similar to their associated standards relative to other patents. Based on the assumption that
the similarity is particularly high for patents which are in fact implemented in a standard,
we expect a positive disclosure effect for such a selection of declared SEPs.
To that end, we link our data on semantic similarity to the authors’ dataset on de-
clared SEPs, which is publicly available as the ‘Disclosed Standard Essential Patents (dSEP)
Database’. We identify 1,183 SEPs declared at ETSI that are among the most similar patents
for their associated standards. We borrow the empirical design by Bekkers et al. (2017) us-
ing a difference-in-differences approach, in which technologically similar patents with the
same citation pre-trend before the SEP declaration serve as control patents. We use a Pois-

















The dependent variable cites
it
, measured on patent-year level, is the count of forward cita-
tions received by subsequent patents. The independent variable of interest PostDisclosure
ijt
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Notes: This figure shows the estimates of the disclosure effect on forward citations based on the full sample
(All) and several subsamples defined by the respective percentile of the similarity rank distribution within
the full sample. Poisson estimates and 90% confidence intervals are shown. Each point corresponds to a
separate regression coefficient estimated as shown in Equation 1. Standard errors are clustered on patent
level. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dotted horizontal lines reflect the effect sizes
at other SSOs, as measured by Bekkers et al. (2017).
is a binary variable that is equal to 1 for each year t after and 0 before SEP declaration to
SSO j. Apart from ETSI, the other organizations considered in the analysis are ANSI, IEEE,
IETF and the combined groups of ATIS, OMA and TIA as well as ISO, ITU and IEC.
Figure 4 shows Poisson estimates for the effect of disclosure on forward citations. Fol-
lowing the econometric approach by Bekkers et al. (2017), we indeed observe a negative
disclosure effect for the full set of SEPs. However, the estimated effect increases substan-
tially for higher percentiles of SEPs by similarity rank. Strikingly, at percentiles of 75 and
above, the effect sizes become comparable to those which Bekkers et al. (2017) estimated
for SEP declarations at other SSOs. We consider this strong evidence for the identification
of truly essential patents through our similarity measure.
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5.3 Benchmark against manual SEP assessments
In the third validation exercise, we make use of a dataset of manually examined SEPs and
test the predictive power of our similarity measure to determine a patent’s true standard
essentiality. In the following, we briefly introduce the dataset of manual SEP assessments
and subsequently present the validation results.
Data origin and overview
The dataset we use was developed by an IP consulting firm involved in the major patent law-
suit TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (TCL v.
Ericsson in the following) before the District Court for the Central District of California.30
The case concerned the calculation of royalty fees for SEPs, but also addressed the ques-
tion of how many declared SEPs are truly essential for GSM, UMTS and LTE standards. The
plaintiff (TCL) recruited the IP consulting firm to assess the essentiality of a selected sample
of declared SEPs. This subsample comprises one-third of all SEPs declared for user equip-
ment (UE) standards. Engineers manually evaluated those patents using the respective
standard specifications on UE. The experts’ essentiality assessments were criticized during
the case because of the relatively short time they spent on each patent. In turn, a smaller
subsample of patents was cross-checked by an independent expert, who – despite of false
positives as well as false negatives – found overall very similar results. The evaluations
were ultimately confirmed and accepted in court. We therefore believe that the results are
a strong indication for true standard essentiality.
Validation regressions
To validate our measures of semantic similarity, we use logistic regression to predict stan-
dard essentiality. We regress the manual SEP assessments on semantic similarity measures
using various specifications.31 Essentiality assessments are reported as binary decision with
1 being actually essential and 0 representing non-essential patents for a corresponding stan-
dard. Approximately 36% of patent families were found to be essential for LTE, 40% for
UMTS and 39% for GSM standards.32 The main variable of interest is the similarity score,
which we report for pairs of patent families and the semantically most similar standard doc-
ument in the sample. Additionally, several patent characteristics are shown. The number
of forward citations is computed on US patent family level. Length claim 1 refers to the
30An elaborate discussion of this case and the decision can be found in Contreras (2017b) and Picht (2018).
31Table B-2 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for the full sample of 2,541 evaluated patent
families.
32This is also within the range of other experts’ evaluations such as PA Consulting (35%), Goodman/Myers
(2010: 50%) or Cyber Creative Institute (2013: 56%), which all vary in terms of the applied level of scrutiny.
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number of words in the first independent claim. Furthermore, the variable Section-specific
declaration indicates whether the declared SEP cites specific sections, tables or figures of a
particular standard document.
In Table 2, we report logistic regression results for correlations between the similarity
measure as independent variable and the manually assessed LTE standard essentiality as
dependent variable. We find positive and statistically significant correlations for the mea-
sure of similarity in all specifications. In the specification without fixed effects in column
(2), the effect size for a one standard deviation increase in similarity score (roughly corre-
sponding to 100 points in our data) is 7.8 pp. This coefficient is remarkably similar to the
one estimated in the full specification in column (5), which includes controls for patent pri-
ority year, declaration year, technology class, technical specification and firm fixed effects.
Including this full set of fixed effects alleviates the concern that the correlation of the sim-
ilarity score with standard essentiality merely reflects different wording styles over time,
technologies, standards or patent holders. In fact, we can confirm that our measure has
explanatory value even within firm SEP portfolios. We further find significant correlations
for the length of the first claim suggesting that patents with shorter, i.e., broader, claims are
more likely to be essential. The number of citations received from SEPs declared at ETSI
are positively correlated with standard essentiality.
We can corroborate the relationship between our similarity measure and standard es-
sentiality for GSM and UMTS standards (see Table B-3 in the Appendix). Although the
subsamples of patents evaluated by technical experts are considerably smaller, we again
observe statistically significant correlations that are highly similar to our results for LTE
patents. If anything, the effect sizes appear to be even larger for UMTS and GSM standards.
A one standard deviation increase in similarity scores corresponds to a 15.3 pp increase in
essentiality for patents relevant for GSM standards and 14.8 pp for patents relevant for
UMTS standards.
To validate predictions of the semantic similarity measure, we consider the sample of
LTE patents and employ 10-fold cross validation for all of our predictions. Using weighted
precision and recall metrics in a logistic regression setup while confining to simple similarity
scores, we obtain scores of 61% and 64%, respectively. Once we control for patent charac-
teristics, precision and recall scores increase to 63% and 65%, respectively. The inclusion of
additional patent characteristics therefore does not seem to improve predictions by much.33
Furthermore, we split the sample of patents evaluated for the LTE standard into a test and
training dataset. 70% of the data are used for training and 30% to test our model.34 These
test and training datasets are used in the subsequent SEP portfolio estimations.
33We report regression results and discuss the relationship between various patent characteristics and the
similarity score in Online Appendix C.
34We report the confusion matrix for the test set of 402 SEPs for LTE standards in Table B-4 in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Logistic regressions: LTE standard essentiality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Similarity score 0.0007⇤⇤⇤ 0.0005⇤⇤⇤ 0.0005⇤⇤⇤ 0.0010⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
SEP transferred (d)  0.1091⇤⇤  0.0835  0.1197⇤  0.1342⇤  0.1130
(0.0513) (0.0534) (0.0714) (0.0712) (0.1384)
# Independent claims  0.0053  0.0021  0.0023  0.0023  0.0079
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0108)
Length claim 1  0.0007⇤⇤⇤  0.0006⇤⇤  0.0006⇤⇤  0.0006⇤⇤  0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
# Inventors  0.0146⇤  0.0115  0.0206⇤⇤  0.0190⇤  0.0096
(0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0181)
# Applicants 0.0018 0.0035 0.0068 0.0084  0.0123
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0144)
Patent family size 0.0039⇤⇤ 0.0042⇤⇤ 0.0042⇤⇤ 0.0053⇤⇤ 0.0077
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0051)
# Patent references  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0012
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
# NPL references 0.0007⇤⇤ 0.0006⇤ 0.0008⇤ 0.0007 0.0012
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008)
# SEP US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 0.0049⇤⇤⇤ 0.0036⇤⇤⇤ 0.0027⇤ 0.0034⇤⇤ 0.0022
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0023)
Section-specific decl. (d) 0.0983⇤⇤⇤ 0.0941⇤⇤⇤ 0.0877 0.0830 0.3075⇤⇤⇤
(0.0293) (0.0295) (0.0536) (0.0568) (0.0977)
Priority year No No Yes Yes Yes
Earliest decl. year No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes Yes Yes
CPC-4 FE No No No Yes Yes
TS FE No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.25
AUC 0.64 0.67 0.74 0.76 0.81
Observations 1289 1289 1289 1289 674
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the patent family is truly essential for LTE standards.
AUC = Area under ROC-Curve. Pairs of SEPs and their most similar standard are selected in the full sample.
Similarity scores are divided by 100. Marginal effects of one unit change are reported. For binary variables
(d) following the variable name indicates a discrete change from 0 to 1. The sample size drops substantially
when fixed effects for technical specifications (TS) are included in the model. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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6 Predicting SEP Portfolio Shares
We use the data from Section 5.3 to predict SEP portfolio shares, i.e., for a given firm the
share of declared patents which (we presume to be) truly standard-essential. While our
predictor is somewhat noisy at the level of individual patents, the prediction errors would
partially cancel out at the portfolio level as long as patents are independent of each other.35
Based on the logistic regression results, we compute the predicted probabilities of standard-
essentiality for a given patent in order to estimate the true share of SEPs bP
F
on firm-level























j=1  ̂ j Xij
, (2)
where n is the number of patents for a given firm F and X
ij
represent the explanatory
variables used in the logistic regression. We confine regressors to those that have shown
statistically significant correlations with true essentiality in the case of LTE standards (cf.
column (1) in Table B-3 in the Appendix): the semantic similarity score, SEP US forward
citations (5yrs), a dummy for section-specific declarations, the number of NPL references
and the length of the first independent claim. The regression results are shown in Table B-5
in the Appendix.
We draw random portfolios from the test dataset on LTE patents to determine the error
of our prediction, on an aggregated level, as a function of the number of patents in the
portfolio.36 First, we compute the predicted probabilities for the test sample based on the
logistic regression results from the training dataset. We then use random sampling with 100
repetitions without replacement to determine the difference between actual and predicted
essentiality ratios for varying numbers of portfolio sizes. Figure 5 plots these differences
in predicted and actual shares of true SEPs against the size of the patent portfolio. For
portfolio sizes of 50 (200) patents, the error is approximately 5.5 pp (2.8 pp). Many firms
have even larger SEP portfolios for a given standard. In such cases, the errors converge
towards 0 in a strictly decreasing function. We therefore fit a power law function to the
35For a discussion of this assumption, see Gambardella et al. (2017).
36We hereby assume that firms’ patent portfolios are randomly composed. The composition of firms’ patent
or SEP portfolios may be based on strategic decisions. However, the error of prediction should remain largely
unaffected from portfolio composition and hence provide a general, firm-independent function.
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data. The following fitted function describes the error rate for LTE patents:37
“ (N) = ↵̂ N k̂, where (3)
↵̂= 0.3916 (± 0.0025),
k̂ = 0.5008 (± 0.0019).




















































































































































Notes: The error of prediction   is plotted as a function of portfolio sizes where portfolios are randomly
drawn from the test sample. Additionally, a non-linear least squares fit is shown for the test sample of LTE
patents. The fitted function is a power law function.
The left-hand side variable “  is the difference in the share of true SEPs for actual as-
sessments and predictions and N the portfolio size, i.e., the number of patents for a given
patent portfolio. We include no additional constant in the power law function such that
the function approaches zero as N !1. The fitted function allows us to determine error
rates for SEP portfolios of larger size than those in the test dataset. For instance, in a large
SEP portfolio of 1,000 declared SEP patent families, the error function yields a prediction
error as low as 1.2 pp.
In Figure 6, we present out-of-sample predictions for firm SEP portfolios separately for
all three standard generations. In Figure 6a, the overall share of presumably true SEPs for
LTE standards is approximately 32.3%, which is 3.6 pp lower than the benchmark evalua-
tions in the manual SEP assessments sample. On firm portfolio level, the share of presum-
ably true SEPs varies substantially from 22.9% to 43.3%. The highest-ranked firm has a
37The error functions for UMTS and GSM standards are qualitatively very similar (see Figure A-3 in the
Appendix).
23










































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4





















































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5























0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Share of presumably true SEPs
 
Notes: The top graph shows the out-of-sample predictions on firm-level for LTE, the lower left-hand graph
for UMTS and the lower right-hand graph for GSM patents. The numbers on the left-hand side of the bars
indicate the count of patent families declared to LTE/UMTS/GSM standards by the respective firm. Only
results for firms with 20 or more declared patents are reported. 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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share of presumably true SEPs that is nearly twice as large as the one for the lowest-ranked
firm. Notably, there seems no strong correlation between the share of presumably true SEPs
and portfolio size. In Figure 6b and Figure 6c, we present similar estimations for patents
declared to UMTS and GSM standards. Interestingly, the average shares of essential patents
are larger for these older generations of mobile telecommunication standards (37.7% for
UMTS and 38.5% for GSM).38 We leave the question as to what causes this trend for fu-
ture work. However, one candidate explanation might lie in the changing composition of
companies contributing technical inventions to standards. First, over time the number of
firms holding a portfolio of at least 20 declared SEPs has increased sharply. Second, over
time the set of patent holders has become more diverse in terms of their business models.
Specifically, there is an increasing number of patent holders that are upstream technol-
ogy contributors with few, if any, activities in the product market. The average ownership
shares of presumably true SEPs are lower (by 3.6 pp or by about 10.2%) for entities that
are primarily upstream technology contributors, as compared to entities that are primarily
downstream standard implementers.39 This finding is consistent with the notion that entities
with upstream business models rely more on licensing revenues (for which the number of
SEPs matters most) than firms with product market activities (cf. Dewatripont and Legros,
2013; Bekkers et al., 2017).
As an alternative explanation, the decrease in the portfolio share of true SEPs may stem
from strategic behavior and learning. Firms may simply have adapted their behavior to the
observations that owning a large portfolio of SEP-declared patents is advantageous in court
proceedings and licensing negotiations.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel automated procedure that calculates the semantic similar-
ity between patents and technical standards. We show that this similarity measure serves
as a meaningful approximation of standard essentiality.
Three validation exercises confirm our measure’s validity. First, we compare pairs of
SEPs and the associated standards to control groups of technologically similar patents and
standard documents within the same standardization project. We observe a significantly
higher semantic similarity for standard-patent pairs defined by SEP declarations. This al-
lows to conclude that the semantic approach is suitable for measuring technological similar-
38Some of these firms are primarily known for being both developers and implementers of more recent
standards such as UMTS and LTE. Nonetheless, they also made SEP declarations to later releases of the older
GSM standard (GSM Phase 2+).
39This descriptive finding at the level of (weighted) SEP firm portfolios is corroborated in a multivariate
regression at the level of the single SEP (see Table C-4 in the Online Appendix).
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ity between patents and standards. Second, we replicate the study of Bekkers et al. (2017)
and examine the ‘disclosure effect’ of SEP declarations on patent forward citations. We build
subsamples of SEPs (declared at ETSI) with high semantic similarity to their associated stan-
dards. In contrast to Bekkers et al. (2017), we are able to find a positive disclosure effect
for these subsamples, as predicted for truly standard-essential patents. Third, we exploit
information on available data of manual essentiality checks for a sample of SEPs for mobile
telecommunication standards. We find strong and highly significant correlations between
the experts’ decisions on standard essentiality and our measure of semantic similarity.
Of course, a text-based determination of standard essentiality comes with some lim-
itations. When inventors and patent attorneys draft a patent, they may either use their
own words or borrow the terminology from standard documents. The calculated similar-
ity scores will likely differ even if the underlying technology is the same. This introduces
potential bias in our measure, especially if patent wording becomes a strategic choice and
the processes of patent filing and standard drafting coincide temporally and/or personally.
Figure A-2 in the Appendix illustrates the relationship between similarity scores of SEPs by
filing year relative to the year of standard publication. Whereas SEPs that are filed shortly
before the respective standard gets published have the highest average similarity, patents
filed much earlier or after the standard publication have a lower average similarity. We
invite future research to build on this stylized finding and further examine the dynamic
aspects of standard essentiality.
Moreover, a patent’s claims solely define its scope of protection and thus essentiality.
Claims are typically written in a highly abstract and generic language, which complicates a
semantics-based analysis. The algorithm we deploy makes, by default, use of both patent
description and patent claims. However, we explore input-specific differences for our sim-
ilarity measure in additional robustness checks (see Online Appendix D) and find that this
alternative similarity score, which is only based on claim text, also shows a statistically
significant relationship with standard essentiality. Even so, the explanatory value of the
similarity measure remains higher when we include the description of the patent alongside
the patent claims as input text. This is not too surprising; interviewed patent attorneys
confirmed that a patent’s description and drawings are frequently considered in manual
essentiality checks.40
In the first use case of our method, we estimate the shares of (presumably) true SEPs in
firm patent portfolios. In doing so, we benefit from the high accuracy of our approach when
predicting standard essentiality on the aggregate level. Based on manual SEP assessments,
we present out-of-sample predictions for firms’ true shares of SEPs for GSM, UMTS and
40As a matter of fact, patent law explicitly states that the description and drawings shall be used to interpret
the claims (see, e.g., Art. 69(1) of the European Patent Convention).
26
LTE standards. We find statistically and economically substantial differences. The highest-
ranked firm has a share of presumably true SEPs which is approximately twice as large
as the one for the lowest-ranked firm. Another interesting finding from this analysis is
the decline in the average share of presumably true SEPs over the three generations of
mobile telecommunication standards. This pattern may be due to an increasing number of
upstream technology contributors, which on average have a lower share of presumably true
SEPs than vertically integrated firms with product market activities. This purely descriptive,
yet intriguing result may be a worthwhile subject for future work on standards and firm
behavior.
Beyond this first use case, we see several potential applications of our method in the
academic as well as the practical realm. Specifically, it may facilitate the assessment of
SEPs as well as the search for relevant, but (so far) undeclared patents. Even though our
method can hardly replace a thorough manual assessment, its suitability for initial patent
screenings can make it a valuable tool for SSOs and firms alike. Furthermore, our approach
may help singling out patents relevant for specific parts of the standard. In turn, this would,
for instance, allow for a mapping of patents to particular standard technologies such as
radio transmission, base stations, or user equipment. Finally, we would like to stress that
our approach offers substantial advantages, in particular in terms of scalability as well as
time- and cost-efficiency. Moreover, the data generated through our method are arguably
more objective and replicable than most of the proprietary datasets on SEP assessments.
Against this backdrop, we hope our method will invite more scholars to empirically study
the important, yet complex relationship between patents and standards.
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Notes: The box plot on the left-hand side shows the difference in similarity scores of SEP declarations (blue)
and control patents compared to the same standard document (red). On the right-hand side, similarity scores
of SEP declarations (blue) are compared to similarity scores of the same SEP and control standard documents
(red). The censored dataset is used in this representation. Differences are significant but considerably less
pronounced relative to the results when using the truncated data. Statistics are shown in Table B-1.
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Notes: The graph shows similarity scores as predicted by OLS regression models of similarity scores on fixed
effects for the year differences between standard publication and patent filing. Differences are left-censored
at  15 and right-censored at 10, respectively. We report results for regressions on patent family level with
and without control variables. Controls include patent characteristics as used in column (2) in Table C-3 as
well as declaration year, TS and CPC-4 fixed effects. 90% confidence intervals are shown.
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Notes: The error of prediction  is plotted as a function of portfolio size where portfolios are randomly drawn
from the test sample of UMTS and GSM patents. Non-linear least squares fits are shown. The fitted functions
are power law functions.
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B Appendix: Tables
Table B-1: T-statistics for the comparison of SEP - standard pairs with control groups
t-value  Score
Uncensored
SEP vs. control patent 61⇤⇤⇤ 59
Standard vs. control standard 127⇤⇤⇤ 135
Censored
SEP vs. control patent 51⇤⇤⇤ 31
Standard vs. control standard 189⇤⇤⇤ 124
Notes: *** indicate significance levels of p < 2⇥ 10 16.  Score denotes the differences in mean similarity
scores for both groups.
Table B-2: Summary statistics (manual SEP assessments sample)
Mean SD Median Min Max N
LTE Essentiality 0.3590 0.4800 0 0 1 1470
UMTS Essentiality 0.3970 0.4900 0 0 1 794
GSM Essentiality 0.3880 0.4880 0 0 1 304
Similarity score 369.3690 108.9510 373 62 758 2163
Patent family size 12.8580 12.5130 10 1 269 2197
# Inventors 3.0030 1.6970 3 1 13 2197
# Applicants 2.1760 1.8360 1 1 13 2197
# Independent claims 4.1210 2.6050 4 1 18 2197
Length claim 1 134.3880 60.2660 125 1 388 2197
# Patent references 27.1880 36.5770 18 0 911 2197
# NPL references 30.1530 67.5580 11 0 1188 2197
# SEP US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 7.2710 9.9180 4 0 122 2014
Section-specific decl. 0.3690 0.4830 0 0 1 2014
SEP transferred 0.0810 0.2740 0 0 1 2197
Earliest decl. year 2009.9900 3.2690 2010 1998 2016 1951
Priority year 2005.3490 3.8030 2006 1989 2012 2197
Notes: Summary statistics for the sample of patent families which were manually scrutinized by technical
experts.
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Table B-3: Predicting standard essentiality
(1) (2) (3)
LTE UMTS GSM
Similarity score 0.0008⇤⇤⇤ 0.0013⇤⇤⇤ 0.0013⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
SEP transferred (d)  0.0725 0.0235 0.0674
(0.0498) (0.0673) (0.1013)
# Independent claims  0.0015  0.0063 0.0079
(0.0054) (0.0069) (0.0113)
Length claim 1  0.0009⇤⇤⇤  0.0006⇤  0.0011⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
# Inventors  0.0137  0.0127 0.0073
(0.0085) (0.0127) (0.0210)
# Applicants 0.0114  0.0128  0.0367⇤
(0.0076) (0.0124) (0.0222)
Patent family size 0.0024 0.0047⇤⇤⇤ 0.0020
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0027)
# Patent references  0.0002  0.0020⇤⇤  0.0016
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0016)
# NPL references 0.0007⇤⇤ 0.0002 0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007)
# SEP US forward citations (5yrs) 0.0027⇤⇤ 0.0005  0.0080
(0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0062)
Section-specific declaration (d) 0.0733⇤⇤ 0.0550 0.1194⇤
(0.0290) (0.0399) (0.0620)
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.09 0.09
AUC 0.67 0.69 0.69
Observations 1339 711 280
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the patent family is truly essential. Regression
results for the three telecommunication standards LTE, UMTS and GSM are reported. AUC= Area under ROC-
Curve. Similarity scores refer to the most similar chapter for any standard in the dataset. Similarity scores
are divided by 100. Marginal effects of one unit change are reported. For binary variables (d) following the
variable name indicates a discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B-4: Confusion Matrix











Notes: Confusion matrix for the test set of LTE SEPs evaluated by the manual SEP assessments data.
Table B-5: Predicting standard essentiality with most relevant characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
LTE UMTS GSM
Similarity score 0.0008⇤⇤⇤ 0.0013⇤⇤⇤ 0.0013⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Length claim 1  0.0009⇤⇤⇤  0.0006⇤⇤  0.0010⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
# NPL references 0.0008⇤⇤⇤ 0.0000 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
# SEP US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 0.0026⇤⇤ 0.0004  0.0086
(0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0058)
Section-specific decl. (d) 0.0802⇤⇤⇤ 0.0695⇤ 0.1262⇤⇤
(0.0283) (0.0390) (0.0606)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.08
AUC 0.67 0.67 0.69
Observations 1339 711 280
Notes: Specifications for out-of-sample predictions presented in Section 6. The dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one if the patent family is truly essential. Regression results for the three telecommunication
standards LTE, UMTS and GSM are reported. AUC = Area under ROC-Curve. Similarity scores refer to the
most similar chapter for any standard in the dataset. Similarity scores are divided by 100. Marginal effects
of one unit change are reported. For binary variables (d) following the variable name indicates a discrete




C Additional Analysis: Characteristics of SEPs
Standard-essential patents, but also patents which are technologically close but not neces-
sarily essential to technical standards, belong to a special group of patents with possibly
high economic and technological value. To learn more about these patents, we correlate
our novel measure of similarity with various patent characteristics. First, we consider the
full sample of patent families which appear in our dataset. Summary statistics for this sam-
ple are reported in Table C-1. Secondly, we consider a subsample of declared SEPs in the
dataset and examine correlations with various patent characteristics.
Table C-1: Summary statistics (full sample)
Mean SD Median Min Max N
Similarity score 180.5240 72.7920 166 37 945 1762842
Similarity rank 1174.5370 883.7230 1021 1 3000 1762842
Granted US patent 0.4740 0.4990 0 0 1 1708537
# US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 11.9130 28.6770 4 0 3264 1320969
# Independent claims 3.2940 2.3880 3 1 39 920780
Length claim 1 132.5870 78.0280 115 0 499 912474
Patent family size 3.0580 3.1680 2 1 472 1708537
# Patent references 12.4550 22.4960 7 0 4148 1708537
# NPL references 3.5080 24.9550 0 0 12854 1708537
# Applicants 1.5550 1.3220 1 1 77 1687964
# Inventors 2.3780 1.6920 2 1 133 1700801
Priority year 2003.7120 9.5470 2006 1950 2017 1707870
Notes: Summary statistics for patent characteristics of all patents in the dataset. Patent characteristics are
on patent family level.
We first consider the full sample of all standards-related patents. In Table C-2, we corre-
late patent characteristics with the measure Similarity score in columns (1) and (2), and the
relative measure Similarity rank in columns (3) and (4). We include fixed effects for CPC-4
technology classes as well as for technical specifications on document level. In columns (1)
and (3), we report significant and positive effects for forward citations and patent family
size, which have been used as proxies for patent value in the literature. Furthermore, we
find a negative relationship between patent grant and the similarity to a technical standard.
We additionally include claim characteristics in the specifications in columns (2) and (4)
and find that more independent claims are associated with a higher likelihood of being
similar to standards. Furthermore, the length of the first claim is negatively correlated with
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similarity suggesting that patents with broader claims are more similar to standards.
Table C-2: Correlation of standards similarity with patent characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score Score Rank Rank
# US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 0.0427⇤⇤⇤ 0.0386⇤⇤⇤  0.2872⇤⇤⇤  0.1688⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.033)
Granted US patent  6.8750⇤⇤⇤ 123.6418⇤⇤⇤
(0.112) (1.680)
Patent family size 0.5398⇤⇤⇤ 0.8150⇤⇤⇤  5.2494⇤⇤⇤  8.6861⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.020) (0.240) (0.290)
# Patent references  0.0441⇤⇤⇤  0.0426⇤⇤⇤ 0.6177⇤⇤⇤ 0.5362⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.037) (0.037)
# NPL references 0.0058⇤  0.0099⇤⇤⇤  0.1032⇤⇤ 0.1269⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.035) (0.035)
# Applicants  0.1676⇤⇤⇤  0.4248⇤⇤⇤ 4.3477⇤⇤⇤ 7.5940⇤⇤⇤
(0.041) (0.047) (0.615) (0.698)
# Inventors 0.0603 0.1327⇤⇤ 0.3340  0.4327
(0.033) (0.042) (0.490) (0.618)
# Independent claims 0.0766⇤⇤ 0.0129
(0.027) (0.400)
Length claim 1  0.0283⇤⇤⇤ 0.3343⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.013)
Priority year Yes Yes Yes Yes
CPC-4 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
TS FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.44 0.14 0.16
Observations 1267261 734587 1267261 734587
Notes: OLS regressions of similarity measures on patent family characteristics. The dependent variables
similarity score and similarity rank are abbreviated as score and rank, respectively. The sample consists of all
patents in the full dataset. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001.
Table C-3 reports correlations of the similarity score with SEP characteristics that show
some differences compared to the full sample of patents. We include fixed effects for CPC-4
technology class and technical specification (TS). Considering column (1), we do not ob-
serve an effect of forward citations on similarity. Only after including SEP forward citations,
we find a statistically significant, negative effect of patent forward citations, whereas SEP
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Table C-3: Correlation of standards similarity with SEP characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Score Score Rank Rank Score Score
# US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 0.0278  0.1595⇤⇤⇤  0.0255 0.4681⇤⇤⇤ 0.1199⇤⇤⇤  0.1570⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.029) (0.098) (0.148) (0.028) (0.044)
Granted US patent 1.2951 0.8413 35.8341⇤⇤⇤ 37.0302⇤⇤⇤ 4.8581 3.3348
(2.074) (2.069) (10.422) (10.418) (4.818) (4.769)
Patent family size 0.0470 0.1074  0.1480  0.3070  0.3194⇤  0.2312
(0.110) (0.110) (0.552) (0.553) (0.188) (0.186)
# Patent references  0.1902⇤⇤⇤  0.1931⇤⇤⇤ 1.1873⇤⇤⇤ 1.1950⇤⇤⇤  0.0570  0.0736⇤
(0.034) (0.034) (0.172) (0.172) (0.044) (0.044)
# NPL references 0.0815⇤⇤⇤ 0.0768⇤⇤⇤  0.5208⇤⇤⇤  0.5084⇤⇤⇤ 0.0516 0.0403
(0.026) (0.026) (0.129) (0.128) (0.036) (0.036)
# Applicants  0.3917  0.5430 6.8290⇤⇤⇤ 7.2278⇤⇤⇤  0.1772  0.2425
(0.497) (0.496) (2.499) (2.499) (0.839) (0.830)
# Inventors  1.0402⇤⇤  1.2051⇤⇤ 2.9709 3.4056  1.0890  1.4472⇤
(0.498) (0.497) (2.501) (2.501) (0.871) (0.863)
Section-specific decl. (d) 1.4308 1.7074  32.9312⇤⇤⇤ 33.6603⇤⇤⇤ 11.5435⇤⇤⇤ 11.2724⇤⇤⇤
(1.822) (1.817) (9.156) (9.151) (3.398) (3.360)
# SEP US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 1.3646⇤⇤⇤  3.5967⇤⇤⇤ 1.8782⇤⇤⇤
(0.160) (0.807) (0.234)
Priority year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Earliest decl. year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CPC-4 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TS FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.47 0.16 0.17 0.57 0.58
Observations 13,330 13,330 13,330 13,330 3,239 3,239
Notes: OLS regressions of similarity measures on patent family characteristics. The dependent variables
similarity score and similarity rank are abbreviated as score and rank, respectively. The sample consists of
SEPs declared at ETSI. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
forward citations are positively related to standards similarity. SEPs that are declared to
specific sections of a standard are relatively more similar to the standard (see columns (3)
and (4)). For the analyses in columns (5) and (6), we reconstructed the sample used in
Stitzing et al. (2017), which comprises 3,239 US SEPs declared to LTE standard documents
until 2013. We observe small effects for forward citations and significantly larger effects for
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SEP forward citations. This result mirrors the results of Stitzing et al. (2017), in particular
the correlation between their patent forward citation measure and LTE standard essential-
ity. They also state that SEPs declared to specific technical specifications are more likely to
be essential – a result that we find as well.
In Table C-4, we furthermore correlate our measure of similarity with firm business
models. We hereby rely on the classification by Bekkers et al. (2017) and differentiate
between up- and downstream firms. These descriptive results reveal substantial differences
in the level of semantic similarity between patents and standards across business models.
This finding is in line with theoretical predictions that the incentives to generate revenues
through SEP licensing is higher for upstream firms (Dewatripont and Legros, 2013).
Table C-4: Correlation of standards similarity with firm business models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Score Score Score Score Score Score
Downstream 35.2386⇤⇤⇤33.4471⇤⇤⇤37.3720⇤⇤⇤32.0548⇤⇤⇤19.9433⇤⇤⇤19.5235⇤⇤⇤
(2.527) (2.608) (2.580) (2.558) (2.245) (2.238)
Patent controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Earliest filing year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Earliest decl. year No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
CPC-4 FE No No No Yes No Yes
Standard doc. FE No No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.20 0.51 0.52
Observations 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181 11,181
Notes: OLS regressions of similarity score on firm business models. The dependent variable similarity score is abbreviated as score. Patent
controls include the variables reported in column (2) in Table C-3. We differentiate between upstream (baseline) and downstream firms
according to the classification by Bekkers et al. (2017). The sample consists of declared SEPs. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D Robustness Checks
In this paper we rely on the semantic algorithm that has the major advantage of searching
for the most similar patents (in the entire patent universe with more than 37 million doc-
uments) for any input text you enter to the machine. Whereas it is not trivial to replicate
such an efficient algorithm, we can test the validity of our main result developing a simple
text mining algorithm that is generally used in the literature (see Section 3.1).
For a small subset of our data, we show that measuring standard essentiality using the
common text-based approaches is relatively simple. The text mining package ‘tm’ that is
implemented in R helps us to convert the text data into a corpus of documents. We remove
any kind of special characters, punctuation, numbers and English stop words. To stem
the words in our corpus, we rely on the stemming algorithm by Porter. The pre-processed
data are then converted into a (sparse) document-term-matrix. Words are weighted by term
frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf). We additionally remove highly sparse terms
and compute the text similarity between patents and standards using cosine similarity. The
comparison conducted for this exercise includes US full text data for patents and full text
data for ETSI’s LTE standards on chapter level. Furthermore, we also use the text of patent
claims (excluding patent description, abstract and title). For both cases, we compare LTE
patents assessed by technical experts to their corresponding standard documents identified
by its engineers. This procedure yields 117,282 text-based comparisons for only 657 patent
families. In Table D-1, we report logistic regression results for the full text comparison using
the alternative similarity measures as described before. Table D-2 reports results when
semantic similarity calculations are confined to patent claim texts only. By comparing the
effect sizes of the similarity score measures in both tables, we find that the coefficients are
larger when also patent title, abstract and descriptions are taken into account. This speaks
in favor of considering all patent text information.
Furthermore, we compute micro-average precision and recall scores. We obtain 63.4%
precision and recall using patent full text data. In comparison, we obtain 62.7% using only
claim texts. These values are comparable, yet slightly inferior to the similarity measure
based on the proprietary algorithm used in this study.
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Table D-1: Logistic regressions: Standard essentiality (alternative measures with patent full
text)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LTE LTE LTE LTE LTE
Similarity score (alt) 0.9946⇤⇤⇤ 0.9671⇤⇤⇤ 0.9212⇤⇤⇤ 0.9183⇤⇤⇤ 1.1633⇤⇤⇤
(0.1542) (0.1731) (0.2020) (0.2236) (0.3050)
SEP transferred (d)  0.1289⇤  0.1991⇤⇤⇤  0.1429  0.2233⇤⇤
(0.0746) (0.0683) (0.1082) (0.1053)
# Independent claims 0.0205⇤⇤ 0.0133 0.0161 0.0271⇤
(0.0088) (0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0143)
Length claim 1  0.0010⇤⇤⇤  0.0008⇤⇤  0.0013⇤⇤⇤  0.0021⇤⇤⇤
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
# Inventors  0.0107  0.0164  0.0175  0.0002
(0.0149) (0.0166) (0.0193) (0.0252)
# Applicants  0.0117 0.0069 0.0113 0.0101
(0.0141) (0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0211)
Patent family size 0.0049⇤ 0.0082⇤⇤ 0.0115⇤⇤ 0.0094
(0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0061)
# Patent references  0.0001 0.0008 0.0002  0.0029
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0021)
# NPL references 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 0.0014
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010)
# US forward citations (5yrs)  0.0014⇤  0.0013  0.0009  0.0014
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012)
# SEP US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 0.0062 0.0052 0.0036 0.0104
(0.0040) (0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0068)
Section-specific decl. (d) 0.1333⇤⇤⇤ 0.0880 0.0883 0.1226
(0.0473) (0.0600) (0.0889) (0.1101)
Priority Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Earliest Decl. Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes
CPC-4 FE No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.21 0.31
AUC 0.64 0.71 0.78 0.80 0.85
Observations 657 573 552 519 448
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the patent family is truly essential for LTE standards.
AUC = Area under ROC-Curve. Pairs of SEPs and their most similar standard in the sample of manual SEP
assessments are selected for the regressions. For patents the full text is used. The alternative similarity scores
are multiplied by 10. Marginal effects of one unit change are reported. For binary variables (d) following the
variable name indicates a discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D-2: Logistic regressions: Standard essentiality (alternative measures with claim text
only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LTE LTE LTE LTE LTE
Similarity score (alt) 0.7787⇤⇤⇤ 0.7954⇤⇤⇤ 0.7449⇤⇤⇤ 0.6671⇤⇤⇤ 0.7753⇤⇤
(0.1708) (0.1955) (0.2269) (0.2514) (0.3138)
SEP transferred (d)  0.1299⇤  0.1894⇤⇤⇤  0.1429  0.2149⇤⇤
(0.0737) (0.0696) (0.1073) (0.1073)
# Independent claims 0.0209⇤⇤ 0.0116 0.0126 0.0242⇤
(0.0087) (0.0098) (0.0114) (0.0140)
Length claim 1  0.0010⇤⇤⇤  0.0008⇤⇤  0.0013⇤⇤⇤  0.0021⇤⇤⇤
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
# Inventors  0.0153  0.0207  0.0179  0.0054
(0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0191) (0.0248)
# Applicants  0.0146 0.0035 0.0075 0.0083
(0.0139) (0.0154) (0.0170) (0.0208)
Patent family size 0.0049⇤ 0.0099⇤⇤⇤ 0.0115⇤⇤ 0.0099
(0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0061)
# Patent references  0.0003 0.0008 0.0000  0.0031
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0021)
# NPL references 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0013
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010)
# US forward citations (5yrs)  0.0012  0.0010  0.0009  0.0013
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011)
# SEP US fwd. cit. (5yrs) 0.0058 0.0038 0.0036 0.0113⇤
(0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0068)
Section-specific decl. (d) 0.1428⇤⇤⇤ 0.0760 0.0960 0.1087
(0.0468) (0.0612) (0.0877) (0.1099)
Priority Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Earliest Decl. Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes
CPC-4 FE No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.20 0.29
AUC 0.60 0.68 0.77 0.79 0.84
Observations 656 572 551 520 448
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the patent family is truly essential for LTE standards.
AUC = Area under ROC-Curve. Pairs of SEPs and their most similar standard in the sample of manual SEP
assessments are selected for the regressions. The alternative similarity scores are multiplied by 10. Marginal
effects of one unit change are reported. For binary variables (d) following the variable name indicates a
discrete change from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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